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Police departments across the nation are challenged to reduce crime, improve 
quality of life, and, with diminished resources, face the increased threats to homeland 
security. Many have struggled to find the right balance between keeping communities 
safe, while at the same time having transparent and effective counterterrorism strategies. 
This thesis examines the role race plays in policing and the criminal justice system. A 
comparative analysis was conducted of the New York Police Department’s community 
policing and counterterrorism strategies and that of the United Kingdom’s counterpart, 
the Metropolitan Police Service. The research focused on how important police 
legitimacy and transparency are to gaining the trust of the community at large. It also 
examined how technology and social media can assist in building trust and enhancing 
accountability. The research concludes with four recommendations, which, if 
implemented, will move the NYPD toward a more balanced counterterrorism strategy 
that actively engages with the community it serves. 
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This research focuses on the challenges facing police today, with agencies being 
asked to stretch their finite resources to address an ever-increasing threat to homeland 
security. In New York City, the requisite shift in manpower and resources to necessary 
counterterrorism efforts resulted in a shift in the New York City Police Department’s 
(NYPD) crime and control strategy. The successful year-over-year reduction in crime in 
NYC is impressive, as is the department’s ability to thwart any further substantial 
terrorist attacks since 9/11. The research, however, found that the NYPD’s proactive 
strategies following 9/11 resulted in many residents questioning the legitimacy and 
transparency of its practices, especially those residing in minority communities.  
A historical analysis of the NYPD found that an informal community-policing 
model was emerging up until the 9/11 attacks. Literally overnight, the NYPD was forced 
to shift priorities and adapt to the newly emerged homeland security threat. Although, by 
many accounts, its counterterrorism and crime control strategies have been largely 
successful, the NYPD can profit from looking at best practices. With this in mind, the 
research examined the counterterrorism policies in the United Kingdom and found that 
the NYPD can benefit from emulating its English counterpart’s substantial efforts in 
community outreach and collaboration, especially within minority communities where 
mistrust and terrorism is most likely to breed.  
It is recommended that the NYPD increase its community policing efforts by 
devoting more resources to community-based initiatives and formalizing department 
policy so that there is a clear-cut community-based policing model. These efforts will not 
only improve traditional crime-fighting efforts, but lead to greater public perception of 
police legitimacy. Muslim communities can also benefit from a Muslim Coordination 
Officer to facilitate community building and enhance police trust. It is furthermore 
recommended that the NYPD increase transparency and accountability by embracing new 
technology. Most importantly, the NYPD should prioritize the department-wide 
implementation of body-worn cameras and initiate a more robust social media policy. 
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On July 17, 2014, a 43-year-old African-American man named Eric Garner was 
approached by plainclothes police officers from the New York City Police Department 
(NYPD) on a Staten Island street. Garner was accused of selling “loosies” (untaxed 
cigarettes), a violation of New York State law. Part of the incident was captured on a 
bystander’s cell-phone video. Garner could be heard saying, “Every time you see me, you 
want to harass me. You want to stop me selling cigarettes. I’m minding my business, 
officer; I’m minding my business. Please just leave me alone. I told you the last time, 
please just leave me alone.”1 When a plainclothes officer approached him from behind in 
an attempt to handcuff him, the 6’2”, 395-pound Garner resisted by flailing his arms. The 
video shows the same officer placing his arm around Garner’s neck, pulling him to the 
ground, and struggling to handcuff him. The video then shows a handcuffed Garner lying 
face down on the sidewalk as he is heard stating, “I can’t breathe,” eleven times.2 At no 
point does the video show either the police officers or the two responding medics 
administer medical aid. Eventually, Garner is placed on a stretcher and brought to 
Richmond University Medical Center. An hour later, the father of six children was 
pronounced dead. 
This deadly encounter—coupled with the police shooting death of Michael 
Brown, an unarmed black teenager, on August 9, 2014, in Ferguson, Missouri—sparked  
anti-police protests throughout the country. In both incidents, the grand jury did not indict 
the officers involved, prompting further protests. In New York City, tensions were high 
as thousands marched through the street chanting, “How do you spell NYPD? KKK.”   
Another chant that sent chills through my spine was, “What do we want? Dead 
cops! When do we want them? Now!” This hateful rhetoric preceded the assassination of 
two NYPD officers, Wenjian Liu and Rafael Ramos. Before going on his deadly mission, 
                                                 
1 Al Baker, J. David Goodman, and Benjamin Mueller, “Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric 




the killer referenced the deaths of Garner and Brown on his Instagram page. He also 
wrote: “I’m Putting Wings on Pigs Today,” and “They Take 1 Of Ours . . . Let’s Take 2 
of Theirs.”3 As a 25-year veteran of the NYPD, I had never before experienced such 
extreme hostility from the very community I and my fellow officers are sworn to protect. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
To be effective, police must have the trust and respect of the communities they 
serve. In 2014, massive protests occurred all over the United States in response to the 
tragic circumstances behind the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner—at the hands 
of police. These events and the ensuing protests had an adverse effect on the relationship 
between the police and the communities they serve, affecting mutual trust and 
accountability. 
This thesis asks: What can be done in New York City to enhance trust between 
the minority communities and the police? Specifically, with finite resources, how can the 
NYPD effectively counter-balance the resources dedicated to traditional counterterrorism 
operations with those dedicated to community policing? The intent of this research is to 
develop a framework to improve police–community relations, with practical 
recommendations at the policy level. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Over the past 25 years, the NYPD has experienced record crime reductions across 
the board.4 This achievement is widely considered a result of strategies involving 
community-oriented initiatives and quality-of-life policing. Since the 1980s, community 
policing has been the accepted avenue toward improving the relationship between the 
community and the police.5 It marked a departure from the traditional paramilitary 
                                                 
3 Larry Celona et al., “Gunman Executes 2 NYPD Officers in Garner ‘Revenge,” New York Post, 
December 20, 2014. 
4 William J. Bratton, “State of the NYPD,” in The Police Commissioner’s Report (New York: New 
York City Policy Department [NYPD], January 2016), 74. 
5 Veena Dubal, “The Demise of Community Policing? The Impact of Post-9/11 Federal Surveillance 




organizational structure toward a greater emphasis on building trust with the communities 
to more effectively address the persistent problems of crime and disorder.6 
Following the events of September 11, 2001—and in the face of the ongoing 
terrorist threats to national security—policing in New York took on the added challenge 
of homeland security. The NYPD built robust counterterrorism and intelligence bureaus 
staffed by more than 1,000 uniformed members of the service (UMOS). The 
department’s strategy includes numerous teams of Emergency Service Unit officers who 
are armed with heavy weapons.7 In an instant, they can be impressively and rapidly 
deployed, along with marked patrol cars from each of the city’s seventy-seven precincts, 
and strategically positioned around the city’s critical infrastructure, such as bridges and 
transportation hubs, and various landmarks.8 
The new emphasis on homeland security shifted the department’s priorities, with 
the resulting reduction of community policing efforts. Unfortunately, this move resulted 
in diminished community relationships, particularly in minority communities. As an 
example, in an effort to combat terrorism following the 9/11 attacks, the NYPD created a 
Demographics Unit. This unit was primarily tasked with the surveillance of Muslim 
communities. Its overt and covert operations fueled distrust of the police department 
within Muslim and minority communities. In April 2014, the unit was disbanded by then-
Police Commissioner William Bratton, who intended “to try to heal rifts between the 
Police Department and minority communities that have felt alienated as a result of 
policies pursued during the Bloomberg administration.”9 
Building trust between the police and the communities they serve is essential to 
keeping any city safe from crime, disorder, and terrorism. In New York City, the costs 
associated with the post-Garner and -Brown protests, subsequent enhanced training, and 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 “Counterterrorism,” NYPD, accessed June 3, 2017, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/ 
investigative/counterterrorism.page. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Matt Apuzzo and Joseph Goldstein, “New York Drops Unit That Spied on Muslims,” New York 
Times, April 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/nyregion/police-unit-that-spied-on-muslims-is-
disbanded.html. 
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new technology have topped $300 million.10 Millions more have been spent across the 
country policing the “occupy” movement that protested social and economic inequality, 
as well as anti-police riots in Ferguson and Baltimore.11 Successful law enforcement 
requires an understanding of how officers are perceived by minority communities and 
how their actions and everyday encounters affect the neighborhoods they serve.   
In order to remain effective, the NYPD must commit to train and equip its officers 
with the necessary resources. To quote Professor Clayton Christensen of Harvard 
Business School: “Three classes of factors affect what an organization can and cannot do: 
its resources, its processes, and its values.”12 The NYPD must have processes and values 
in place to ensure consistent transparency, including developing an open dialogue with 
minorities and cultivating collaborative relationships in which all parties share a vested 
interest in maintaining a safe city, free from crime, disorder, and terror. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The body of literature provides a clear historical perspective of police practice in 
the NYPD. In analyzing what can be done to build trust between minorities and police, 
this research begins with the foundation of policing in America, leading up to the current 
homeland security era.13  
Police agencies within the United Kingdom provide a telling comparison of 
counterterrorism policies. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the NYPD made a clear 
shift in policing—a move away from community policing to focus on the rising terror 
threat—whereas the United Kingdom made community policing a focal point in its 
                                                 
10 Chris Smith, “After the Killings, Bill de Blasio and Bill Bratton Now Have the Most Critical 
Relationship in New York,” New York Magazine, December 23, 2014, http://nymag.com/daily/ 
intelligencer/2014/12/bratton-de-blasio-after-killings.html#; Tatiana Schlossberg, “New York City Police 
to be Equipped with Smartphones and Tablets,” New York Times, October 24, 2014, www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/10/24/nyregion/new-york-city-police-to-be-equipped-with-smartphones-and-tablets.html?_r=0. 
11 Susanna Kim, “Occupy Protests across the Country Take Toll on City Budgets,” ABC News, 
November 18, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/US/man-charged-shooting-death-good-samaritan-due-
court/story?id=36501282. 
12 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to 
Fail (Brighton, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 1997). 
13 Willard M. Oliver, “The Fourth Era of Policing: Homeland Security,” International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology 20, no. 1–2 (2006): 53, doi: 10.1080/13600860600579696.  
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counterterrorism strategy. In this literature review, the author conducts a comparative 
analysis of how the NYPD and the United Kingdom police minority communities, with a 
focus on the City of London Police and the Metropolitan Police Service. Police 
legitimacy remains key in gaining community trust in policing—as does a clear 
understanding of the racial disparities in enforcement of laws and regulations, including 
but not limited to traffic stops and other police actions. The final segment of the literature 
review examines how new technology can help build trust, accountability, and 
transparency.  
1. Foundations of Policing in America 
The role of police within the United States has been forged over time. With this in 
mind, any attempt to describe the police and their function must begin with an analysis of 
their historical development.14 American policing was loosely patterned after Sir Robert 
Peel’s development of the London Metropolitan Police, established in 1829. In 
organization and administrative structure, he developed it from the military model. He 
ensured, however, that there was a clear distinction between the police and the military—
most notably, Peel’s eponymous “bobbies” were unarmed, save for a nightstick, for most 
of the force’s history. Peel’s principles embraced policing by consent. His philosophy 
was that “police are the people, people are the police,” and heavy intrusion is not 
necessary.15 Historian M.A. Lewis states, “Many American police departments champion 
the same tenets that originated with Peel.”16 
Professional policing began to emerge in the United States in the 1840s and 
1850s.17 Examining the evolution of policing in America will help identify the complex 
issues that are addressed on a daily basis by police forces across the country, who protect 
life and property in the face of an increasing terrorist threat to homeland and national 
                                                 
14 Steven G. Brandl and David E. Barlow, The Police in America: Classic and Contemporary 
Readings (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2004), 1. 
15 M.A. Lewis, “Perspective: Peel’s Legacy,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 80, no. 12 (December 
2011): 8–11, https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/december/perspective-peels-legacy. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Michael D. White, Current Issues and Controversies in Policing (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 2007), 1. 
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security. In “The Evolving Strategy of Policing,” Professors George Kelling and Mark 
Moore broke down police history into three time periods: “the political era,” “the 
reform era,” and “the community problem-solving era.”18 Historically, early policing in 
the United States was described as political and corrupt, with various interest groups 
seeking to govern the police.19 The political era in American policing occurred from 
1840 through the 1930s. During this time period, police often resided in the 
neighborhoods they patrolled.20 This closely intertwined relationship and decentralized 
approach, characterized by a lack of overall supervision, gave rise to corruption by 
promoting political favoritism and nepotism. As author Dennis J. Stevens points out, 
“The circumvention of Prohibition, fueled by organized crime, is one example of how 
abuses of political authority were produced by the link between politics and police.”21 
In 1931, President Hoover charged the National Commission on Law Observance 
and Enforcement with investigating the politicization of the policing function. The 
Commission blamed both the police and politicians for corruption and incompetence, and 
encouraged reform.22 Moving forward, the reform era of policing, between the 1930s and 
1970s, brought law and professionalism, as well as a more centralized structure for 
crime fighting.   
Crime and disorder in the 1960s and 1970s generated volatility.23 There was a 
distancing between the police and their citizens. This development led to the third era of 
policing—the “community era”—and the “realization that in order for police to 
effectively perform their job, they needed the assistance of the citizenry.”24 This third era 
                                                 
18 George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore, “The Evolving Strategy of Policing,” Perspectives on 
Policing 4 (November 1988): 1–15. 
19 Robert M. Fogelson, Big-City Police (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); Samuel 
Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform: The Emergence of Professionalism (Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1977). 
20 Brandl and Barlow, Police in America, 31. 
21 Dennis J. Stevens, An Introduction to American Policing (Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett, 2009), 
55. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Brandl and Barlow, Police in America, 17. 
24 Mark H. Moore and George L. Kelling, “To Serve and Protect: Learning From Police History,” 
Public Interest 70 (1983): 49–65. 
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focused on community problem solving; community and political support were coupled 
with police professionalism in the hope of reducing crime and disorder while improving 
the community’s perception of the police.25 The function of the police became broad and 
far reaching: the relationship with the environment was intimate, foot patrols and crime 
control strategies were developed, and the problem-solving approach to policing took 
hold. This collaboration between police and the public drastically improved trust levels; 
with community members being more willing to work with investigators, arrest and 
conviction rates increased.26 
More recently, some have written about a fourth era: the homeland security era, in 
which police are responsible for national/international threats, law, and professionalism. 
This era is driven by the events of 9/11 and the ongoing threat to national and 
international security.27 In addition to the traditional crime-control functions, police 
agencies now devote tremendous amounts of resources into counterterrorism and 
intelligence-gathering efforts. The outcome for this evolving era is citizen safety, crime 
control, and counterterrorism effects.28 
2. Community Policing in America 
Since the early 1980s, community policing has been widely embraced as the 
remedy to poor police–community relations.29 As the early founder of problem-oriented 
policing, Professor Herman Goldstein proposed a radical departure from traditional 
policing.30 He recognized that policing needed to move away from its rigid approach to a 
more considerate practical solution. Professors Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Buquerox 
labeled community policing as the “first major reform in policing since police 
                                                 
25 Oliver, “Fourth Era of Policing,” 53. 
26 Kelling and Moore, “Evolving Strategy of Policing,” 57. 
27 Oliver, “Fourth Era of Policing,” 53. 
28 Ibid., 54. 
29 Dubal, “Demise of Community Policing.” 
30 Herman Goldstein, Problem Oriented Policing (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 11. 
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departments embraced scientific management principles more than a century ago.”31 It 
was a move away from traditional, incident-driven policing to encourage a hands-on, 
practical approach to counter crime and disorder.32 Community policing was designed to 
bring the community and police together to affect desired change collaboratively.  
Despite hundreds of books, journals, and articles that examine community 
policing, there remains no clear definition of the term or the approach. As Harry W. 
Moore notes, “Community policing varies considerably from department to 
department.”33 Broadly, most researchers and practitioners concur that community 
policing embraces proactive problem solving and collaboration with the community to 
address identified concerns of crime and disorder. 
The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community-Orientated Policing 
Services defines community policing “as a philosophy that promotes organizational 
strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques 
to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such 
as crime, social disorder and fear of crime.”34 Researchers Trojanowicz and Carter define 
community policing as a philosophy that supports a “proactive, decentralized approach, 
designed to reduce crime, disorder, and by extension, fear of crime, by intensely 
involving the same officer in the same community on a long-term basis”; the goal is for 
officers to develop trust with residents so they can provide “assistance to achieve those 
three crucial goals.”35 
                                                 
31 Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux, Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective 
(Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1990), 3. 
32 Ken Peak and Emmanuel P. Barthe, “Community Policing and CompStat: Merged, or Mutually 
Exclusive?,” The Police Chief LXXVI, no. 12 (December 2009).  
33 Harry W. More, Current Issues in American Law Enforcement: Controversies and Solutions 
(Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 2008), 39. 
34 Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), Community Policing Defined (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2012), http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p157-pub.pdf. 
35 Robert C. Trojanowicz and David Carter, The Philosophy and Role of Community Policing (East 
Lansing: Michigan State University, 1988), http://msucj.bcpdev.com/assets/Outreach-NCCP-GB14.pdf. 
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Kelling and Coles describe six fundamental tenets of community policing. “The 
first is belief in a broad policing function” beyond fighting crime and law enforcement.36 
Second, they acknowledge that police rely on citizens in several ways, “for authority to 
police neighborhoods, for information about the nature of neighborhood problems, and 
for collaboration in solving problems.”37 Third, community policing recognizes that 
police work is complex. Fourth, it avoids traditional police tactics, like “preventative 
patrol and rapid response to calls for service, in favor of specific tactics, targeted on 
particular problems.”38 These problems are identified through partnerships formed with 
the community, and governmental and private-sector agencies. Fifth, “authority must be 
devolved to lower levels of the police organization.”39 Police officers ought to be 
assigned to steady beats so they become familiar with their community and its needs. 
Finally, police have broad functions: “the broadest goal is to help communities maintain a 
safe environment, in which basic institutions (the family, churches, schools, commerce) 
can operate effectively and thrive.”40  
Most researchers agree that community policing comprises three key components: 
1) collaborative partnerships between the community and the police, which collectively 
address and prioritize community concerns; 2) organizational transformation, through 
which management and personnel develop the structure to effectively collaborate with 
the community; and 3) problem solving through “proactive and systematic examination 
of identified problems to develop and evaluate effective responses.”41 
Trojanowicz and Carter state, “Community policing seeks to intervene directly in 
the twin problems of crime and disorder” through the formation of strong community 
partnerships that foster information sharing and unified goals to address specific 
                                                 
36 George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing 





41 COPS, Community Policing Defined. 
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problems, including the development of a strategic plan of action.42 Community policing 
philosophy recognizes that the police alone cannot solve problems associated with 
disorder and crime. Establishing collaborative partnerships will help build trust and 
mutual respect. The partnerships should include other governmental agencies (such as 
public works, prosecutors, probation and parole, health service, and schools), community 
members (residents, business owners, volunteers, activists, and informal and formal 
leaders), nonprofits (advocacy and support groups), and the media.43  
Forming alliances with the true stakeholders—those affected by the problem—to 
find a solution should be the goal of the police. Established community groups most 
likely have identified problems for which they would gladly accept the assistance of the 
police to solve. Once these alliances are established and immediate problems are 
addressed, the likelihood of the community partnering with police on future problem-
solving endeavors will increase.44 
Building trust requires sustained effort, but it is essential before police can 
identify and address the true concerns of the community. The methods used to gain 
cooperation and support must be tailored to individual neighborhoods. Poorer minority 
communities that experience a greater police presence may be less trusting than more 
affluent communities. Moore, Trojanowicz, and Kelling believe “building bonds in some 
neighborhoods may involve supporting basic social institutions (e.g., families, churches, 
schools) that have been weakened by pervasive crime or disorder.”45 
Organizational transformation is necessary if community policing is to be 
effective. Most traditional policing operations are centralized, rigid, and structured 
around responding to calls for service. The community policing approach is much more 
flexible, with officers empowered to make decisions and create resolutions without 
                                                 
42 Trojanowicz and Carter, Philosophy and Role of Community Policing. 
43 COPS, Community Policing Defined. 
44 More, Current Issues in American Law Enforcement, 43. 
45 Mark H. Moore, Robert C. Trojanowicz, and George L. Kelling, “Crime and Policing,” 
Perspectives on Policing 2 (June 1988): 10, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/111460.pdf. 
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having to respond to the bureaucracy.46 Ideas and problem solving are decentralized to 
the lower levels of the organization. At this level, officers are encouraged to engage in 
proactive and creative solutions to combat crime and disorder.47 Goldstein has noted that 
“community policing will work only if rank-and-file police officers buy into the 
concept.”48  
Both management and staff are expected to support field operations, but the 
philosophy should be part of the organization’s mission statement.49 This statement 
should have clear goals expressing the value and commitment of the organization to 
involve the community “in matters that directly affect the safety and quality of 
neighborhood life” and recognize the merits of that involvement.50 
Problem solving is a process of engaging in hands-on and methodical analysis to 
identify underlying causes of a problem with the goal of developing a mitigating strategy 
for effective response. In community policing, the problem-solving strategy encourages 
agencies and officers to think outside the box and be creative and proactive in finding 
solutions. A model outlined by the Department of Justice’s Community-Orientated 
Policing Services is the SARA (scanning, analysis, response, and assessment) problem-
solving model.51 
Scanning initiates the problem-solving process with a preliminary analysis to 
determine the nature of a problem. The police, with the collaboration of their community 
partners, can move forward to identify and prioritize concerns. The next step, analysis, is 
at the crux of problem solving. This step also marks the gathering stage for the collection 
of intelligence and information. This process enables the organization to gain a full 
understanding of the problem, which is necessary for the development of a plan for 
                                                 
46 COPS, Community Policing Defined. 
47 Peak and Barthe, “Community Policing and CompStat.”  
48 Herman Goldstein, “Toward Community-orientated Policing: Potential, Basic Requirements, and 
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49 More, Current Issues in American Law Enforcement, 41. 
50 Lee P. Brown, “Community Policing: A Practical Guide for Police Officials,” Perspectives on 
Policing 12 (September 1989): 5, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/118001.pdf. 
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resolution.52 The response stage “requires initiative by the officer, as different solutions 
are identified and the best solution is selected and implemented.”53 The goal of the 
response is to mediate the problem to the desired level. Some problems may be 
substantially mitigated or eliminated. The final stage is the assessment of how well the 
program performed by measuring the success of the response. “The process should be 
reviewed as circular rather than linear, meaning that additional scanning, analysis, 
responses and/or assessments may be required.”54  
Community policing requires long-term commitment, coupled with proper 
planning and implementation. It is an investment by both the police and their partners to 
identify and prioritize specific concerns of a neighborhood, and necessitates a defined 
plan of action for mitigating or eliminating those concerns. In order to be most effective, 
police organizations must decentralize control and empower the lowest levels of their 
agencies. 
3. Police Legitimacy 
The relationship between the police and citizens is key to understanding 
legitimacy as it relates to policing. In general, police can be considered legitimate when 
the public believes they are acting in a moral, ethical way. When police authority is 
viewed as legitimate, such widespread benefits abound as the facilitation of voluntary 
cooperation and self-regulation.55 Tyler wrote, “To the degree that cooperation is 
motivated by personal values … [it] does not depend upon the ability of the authorities to 
effectively deploy incentives or sanctions to secure desired behavior.”56 
Citizens’ views about police legitimacy shape cooperative behavior.57 The debate 
continues as to whether or not police legitimacy matters in regards to public safety, the 
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53 Ibid., 53. 
54 COPS, Community Policing Defined. 
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types of policing that enhance legitimacy, and how they affect a community’s perception 
of police.58   
When police actions are viewed as illegitimate, it causes harm that can corrode 
ties between citizens and law, as seen in the Ferguson riots. Experiences that citizens 
have with police often shape their views of police legitimacy, whether personal, 
vicarious, or through media exposure. Bradford et al. argue that the quality of a person’s 
direct social and physical environment also has significant influence on the way that 
person thinks about the police. They assert that “the willingness of local people to 
intervene on behalf of the collective good” creates a more orderly community with less 
need for police intervention, making the police actually appear to be more effective.59 
Citizens make active assessments of police behavior that vary depending on context. At 
different dates, times, and incidents, their viewpoint of police legitimacy may change.60 
4. Procedural Justice 
Police are effective when their actions are viewed as legitimate, and the public 
thus accepts their authority. Schulhofer, Tyler, and Huq suggest that “police build this 
valuable attribute of legitimacy” through a set of practices called “procedural justice,” 
and that people obey the law regardless of imagined rewards or punitive consequences 
when they view the police as trustworthy.61  
Procedural justice is the pathway to legitimacy in policing. Procedural justice 
means that a community is given opportunities to be heard through public forums. It 
means that that the police are responding to community concerns and acting 
appropriately, operating based on factual rules, not personal bias. This community focus, 
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coupled with treating the public with dignity and respect and clarifying the reasons for 
certain police actions, facilitates legitimacy.62 
Procedural justice is hard to gauge; it depends on the community’s evaluation of 
the police’s impartial, discretionary use of authority.63 Law professor and researcher Tom 
Tyler references studies that have shown that people view police as legitimate following 
a negative outcome, as long as they were treated fairly and with respect.64 Operating with 
procedural justice develops a shared respect between police and the community. “This 
gives the police greater flexibility to concentrate their resources on serious crime … [and] 
police efforts to combat crime are improved.”65   
According to McArdle and Erzen, despite the NYPD being “widely credited with 
reducing violent crime to record levels … New Yorkers, especially minorities, express 
widespread discontent with policing and with the police.”66 To gain an understanding of 
the growing tensions between minority communities and the police in the United States, 
Dr. Fathali Moghaddam’s “staircase to terrorism” theory can be applied. Exploring the 
staircase metaphor—understanding that on each floor there are psychological processes 
combined with both individual and collective identity issues that can ultimately lead to a 
terrorist act at the top floor—can better equip those in law enforcement tasked with 
preventing such an attack.67 
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Moghaddam describes a staircase where a “fundamentally important feature of the 
situation is how people perceive the building, and how they see doors and spaces on each 
floor.”68 He believes that an individual’s discernment of prejudice, morality, and identity 
lead them to move up the staircase to terrorism, while millions of others who experience 
the same conditions do not. As individuals climb up the staircase, their choices become 
fewer and fewer, until the last choice is an act of terrorism. In analyzing the staircase 
metaphor in the context of police–community relations, some similarities can be drawn. 
The purpose of drawing these similarities is to help police understand the challenges 
facing many minority communities and how certain police actions, although justified, 
might be perceived differently. Using this analogy, one can see how procedural justice 
can minimize the distrust between minority communities and police by providing mutual 
respect and a forum for both sides to be heard and understood. 
The Pew Research Center has found evidence of a breach in trust between citizens 
and police, particularly in treating races equally.69 Distrust and longstanding racial 
grievances between minority citizens and police remain high. A national survey of 1,501 
adults by the Pew Research Center and USA Today (conducted August 20–24, 2014) 
found that “most Americans give relatively low marks to police departments around the 
country for holding officers accountable for misconduct, using the appropriate amount of 
force, and treating racial and ethnic groups equally.”70 Contrastingly, Americans also 
said that they were fairly confident in their local police agencies. From this poll, it is 
evident that police legitimacy at the national level is being questioned by the public at 
large.71 According to the Pew Research Center, the level of confidence the public has in 
local police treating whites and blacks equally appears to point to a racially divided 
society:72 
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In their book, Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship, Epp, 
Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel explain: 
At center stage in examining racial disparities in police stops are two 
competing arguments: the first is that racial disparities reflect racism 
(whether deliberate or implicit) on the part of the officer; and the other is 
that the rational for stopping blacks at higher rates is because they commit 
crimes at higher rates.73 
5. Technology 
Over the past few years, improvements in law enforcement technology have 
advanced at a rapid pace. The NYPD recently completed a major initiative to upgrade its 
mobile technology platform. The initiative outfitted over 6,000 police cars with tablet 
computers, provided individual smartphones to each of the NYPD’s over 36,000 officers, 
and built a city-wide fiber-optic system that is the third largest in the tri-state region 
(behind only AT&T and Verizon). These devices are linked to the NYPD’s Domain 
Awareness System (DAS), a robust computer system the department pioneered with the 
assistance of Microsoft. Among many of its crime-fighting applications, DAS grants 
officers access to comprehensive online surveillance to detect and prevent terrorist acts.74 
The NYPD and police departments across the country utilize various technologies, such 
as license plate readers, gunshot detection systems, facial recognition software, predictive 
analytics, and social media monitoring.75 These technologies are changing policing on a 
daily basis, essentially enhancing situational awareness and preparedness, reducing 
response times, and improving officer safety.  
The latest police technology use to emerge is body-worn cameras (BWCs), which 
help document police and citizen contact. BWCs’ video outputs can bring transparency 
and accountability to a controversial incident. Public outrage over the recent deaths of 
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unarmed black men by police sparked numerous protests and riots across the nation. If 
there had been complete video from an officer’s BWC in any of these scenarios, it may 
have led to a different outcome or, at the very least, taken the ambiguity out of the 
investigation.  
Substantial subjective evidence and multiple studies support that BWC use, and 
the related consciousness of the equipped officers and their subjects, adjusts the actions 
of both, resulting in less aggression and fewer civilian complaints.76 BWCs can also 
protect police agencies from unjustified lawsuits, saving agencies money and resources.77 
BWC use may also reduce negative publicity surrounding police shootings. The fact is 
that the actions of police officers are scrutinized and continually criticized by the media 
and the public, often before the facts of an event have been carefully evaluated.   
Michael White conducted a review of three experimental studies in the United 
States that examined the implementation and effects of BWCs.78 The first was the Rialto 
study, in Southern California, which evaluated the impact of BWCs on community 
complaints and charges of excessive police force, comparing charges against officers 
with and without the cameras.79 The second study was a year-long assessment of the 
Mesa (Arizona) Police Department, where fifty officers were outfitted with TASER Axon 
Flex BWCs. The study “focused on the system’s impact on reducing civil liability, 
addressing departmental complaints, and enhancing criminal prosecution.”80 The third 
study, of the Phoenix (Arizona) Police Department and Arizona State University, was 
part of the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s Smart Policing Initiative.81 It involved fifty-six 
officers wearing VIEVU BWCs, and it examined “whether the cameras deter 
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unprofessional behavior from officers, lower citizen complaints, reduce citizen resistance, 
and disprove allegations against officers.”82  
In 2013, the Police Executive Research Forum surveyed 500 agencies. Of the 254 
responding agencies, 75 percent did not use BWCs.83 It seems inevitable, however, that 
more agencies will examine the potential benefits of BWCs, especially in light of the 
decision made by Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Federal District Court in Manhattan, who 
mandated that the NYPD equip its officers with BWCs.84 The NYPD has just begun a 
one-year rolling study in which it is equipping over 1,000 officers with VIEVU BWCs in 
twenty precincts across the city. Utilizing a cluster randomized controlled trial design, the 
department will compare these twenty “treatment” precincts with twenty pre-selected 
control precincts, examining possible impacts on civilian complaints, use-of-force 
incidents, lawsuits, officer injuries, resisting arrest information, and officer and civilian 
surveys. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research evaluates policing in New York City as it pertains to police 
relations in minority communities through a comparative analysis of how the NYPD and 
the United Kingdom polices minority communities, with a focus on the City of London 
Police and the Metropolitan Police Service. There are many policies and practices that 
law enforcement agencies can use to improve transparency and build trust. This research 
uses a policy options analysis to examine two specific NYPD policies important in 
establishing legitimacy, the department’s use of BWCs, and the department’s social 
media policy.  
The use of BWCs has become more widespread in law enforcement. In 2015, the 
U.S. Department of Justice announced a three-year plan to invest $75 million to purchase 
                                                 
82 Ibid., 18. 
83 COPS and PERF, “Guidelines to Help Formulate Model Policy for an Evolving Technology: Body-
Worn Cameras,” PERF, 2014, 4, http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/ 
Technology/presentation%20-%20guidelines%20to%20help%20formulate%20model%20policy% 
20for%20body-worn%20cameras%202013.pdf. 
84 Floyd v. State of New York et al., 959 F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y, August 12, 2013). 
 19 
50,000 cameras for law enforcement agencies.85 Former Attorney General Loretta E. 
Lynch stated, “Body-worn cameras hold tremendous promise for enhancing transparency, 
promoting accountability, and advancing public safety for law enforcement officers and 
the communities they serve.”86  
Similarly, police departments understand the power of social media and its 
influence on public perception. Social media provides a platform to reach a wider 
audience, educate the public, and counteract some of the negative effects of media 
reporting. In their study, Duffy et al. argue that the media play a substantial role in 
influencing the public’s perception of increased crime.87 Despite falling crime rates over 
the last decade, American public opinion still has not changed on this issue, and there 
continues to be a high level of anxiety about crime.88 Copitch and Fox agree that law 
enforcement should use social media to improve confidence in the police.89 
E. HYPOTHESIS 
The application of best practices learned from the United Kingdom’s policing of 
ethnic minority communities can help the NYPD improve, and in some cases rebuild, 
trust with minority communities. Two specific strategies that can be utilized to improve 
transparency and increase police legitimacy in New York City are the department-wide 
utilization of BWCs and a more robust and responsive social media policy. 
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F. THESIS OUTLINE 
(1) Introduction 
Since 2014, there has been growing tension between police and some of the 
communities they serve. This chapter has described how the erosion of trust in policing 
came about as many departments moved away from community policing in order to 
adjust to the growing demands for homeland security in the face of the ongoing threat of 
terrorism. A particularly glaring example was the NYPD’s creation of the Demographics 
Unit, which was tasked with monitoring the Muslim community. This covert effort, 
coupled with racial disparities in police stops, fueled public distrust and alienated many 
in the minority community. In this chapter’s literature review section, the foundation of 
policing in America was examined with an in-depth analysis of community policing. The 
concept of procedural justice as a pathway for police to gain and build legitimacy, as well 
as minimize the distrust of minority communities, was examined. An assessment of the 
role of technology, particularly officers’ use of BWCs, was conducted to determine if 
BWCs improve transparency and accountability. 
(2) How the Problem Developed over Time 
Chapter II describes the NYPD’s Community Police Office Program (CPOP), 
which began in the mid-1980s and was never fully supported by the rank and file; as 
such, it was destined to fail. The Program lacked clear goals and was instituted with little 
or no formal officer training. Another reason for the demise of CPOP was the NYPD’s 
inability to accept the organizational change in adopting community policing as the 
overall philosophy of the department.  
With the passing of the Safe Streets, Safe City Act in 1991, thousands of 
additional police officers were hired. The hirings came with a change of administration in 
City Hall, and a new police commissioner, William Bratton. Commissioner Bratton 
brought with him a new style of policing that focused on quality-of-life issues and 
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introduced the NYPD to the broken windows theory.90 The theory contended that 
concentrating on preventing minor quality-of-life violations ultimately prevents more 
serious offenses from occurring.  
Bratton focused on results-driven policing and created five crime-control 
strategies in his first year. He believed in decentralization, and empowered his precinct 
commanders to make their own decisions and develop strategies to effectively reduce 
crime. Bratton also believed strongly in holding precinct commanders accountable for 
those strategies, and he accomplished this measure by implementing Compstat. A data-
driven program, Compstat highlights crime “hot spots” (locations of shootings, robberies, 
etc.). In these hot spots, there is an expected increase of “dots” (arrests, summonses, 
stops, etc.). After the implementation of Compstat, an historic decline in crime began in 
New York City, which continues today.91 However, the overzealous use of “stop, 
question, and frisk,” coupled with a continued high level of enforcement in primarily 
minority neighborhoods where crime remained, led to a steady breakdown in trust. 
(3) The NYPD Today  
At the time of this writing, the NYPD recognized the need for a change in its 
approach toward engagement with the community. In pursuit of this goal, the department 
implemented a new policing strategy focused on neighborhood-based policing. Chapter 
III explains the new program and the duties and responsibilities of the neighborhood 
coordination officers (NCOs), and provides an assessment of how the program is viewed 
both internally and externally. It also examines two newly created units, the 
Counterterrorism Bureau’s Critical Response Command (CRC) and the Special 
Operations Division’s Strategic Response Group. Lastly, the chapter reviews the NYPD’s 
BWC and social media policies. 
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(4) The United Kingdom  
Chapter IV examines the development of community policing in the United 
Kingdom, which began in the mid-1980s, through its operations at the time of this 
writing. It also analyzes the United Kingdom’s current counterterrorism strategy. 
(5) Conclusion 
Chapter V describes the findings of this research and makes four 
recommendations for how the NYPD can enhance transparency and improve mutual trust 
between officers and minority communities through a more robust, collaborative, and 
transparent approach in its community policing and counterterrorism strategies. 
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II. HOW THE PROBLEM DEVELOPED OVER TIME 
This chapter begins with a review of community policing. It examines how 
community policing evolved, influenced by the political climate and the philosophy 
embodied by the various police commissioners. The chapter moves on to analyze the 
effects of the broken windows theory (implemented in the early 1990s) on crime control, 
and, more importantly, the theory’s impact on the minority community. Finally, the 
chapter focuses on the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and the new responsibility of 
homeland security. 
A. COMMUNITY POLICING 
Modern community policing in the NYPD took shape in the early 1980s. 
However, it was preceded by other community-orientated programs, such as 
Neighborhood Police Teams (NPT); Park, Walk and Talk; and the Cop on the Block. 
These programs were introduced in the early 1970s by then-Police Commissioner Patrick 
Murphy.92 He initiated these programs in order to “build closer ties to business people 
and residents on their beat.”93 The programs increased police visibility via foot patrols 
and were broadly popular with residents.94 There were, however, significant 
shortcomings. NPT was a project limited to certain areas of the city, where it received 
little managerial support and was quickly eliminated when the city’s fiscal crisis hit in the 
mid-1970s.95 Team policing was designed to improve police–community relations and 
officer morale while delivering better police response, but it was “implemented very 
quickly by new chiefs with little planning.”96 Gay, Day, and Woodward found that team 
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policing failed because “program administrators and officers failed to implement the 
most basic components of team policing.”97  
In 1984, the Vera Institute of Justice, in collaboration with the NYPD, created the 
Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP) as a pilot program in Brooklyn’s 72nd 
Precinct. The Program was designed to allow officers to engage with the community and 
effectively reduce crime and disorder.98 The goals of the program were outlined in 
NYPD Operations Order 71, issued July 10, 1984. They were: 
a) To increase community awareness of crime problems and foster the 
development of community-based crime prevention efforts. 
b) To develop strategies for tactical operations which respond to specific 
community and neighborhood problems and needs. 
c) To increase community involvement in policing activities through special 
programs, meetings, and the permanent assignment of police officers to 
neighborhood beats. 
d) To reduce the fear of crime in the community and increase individual 
citizen’s sense of personal safety. 
e) To decrease the amount of actual or perceived criminal activity in the 
target neighborhoods.99 
An internal review deemed CPOP a success, and by 1987 the Program had been 
expanded to all police precincts citywide.100 CPOP was formed as a separate unit of 
community patrol officers under the direct supervision of a sergeant, who reported 
directly to the precinct commander.101  
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The foundation of community policing consisted of two main components: 
community partnership and problem solving. According to the U.S. Department of 
Justice, “Community partnership means adopting a policing perspective that exceeds the 
standard law enforcement emphasis.”102 This perspective acknowledges the importance 
of actions that contribute to the “orderliness and well-being of a neighborhood.”103 The 
partnership between police and the community is needed to develop collaborative 
solutions to address the concerns of the community and enhance trust in police.104 
Problem solving is a proactive process that clearly identifies specific problems in order to 
develop effective responses.105 Both components were a move away from the traditional 
policing strategy.106  
According to Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, community policing is a 
philosophy—not a tactic—and requires the same officers to police the same 
neighborhoods day in and day out.107 In line with this philosophy, the NYPD created 
community-policing units in every police precinct, with officers assigned to steady beats 
(foot patrol assigned to a specific area). The officers were tasked with becoming familiar 
with those who worked, lived, or operated businesses on their beats. Public and private 
partnerships were encouraged, and a reciprocal flow of information between the police 
and the public manifested. Yet the Community Police Officer Program that began in the 
mid-1980s ended in the early 1990s.108 “Contrary to public announcements and ‘good 
press,’ community policing did not become the department’s dominant philosophy.”109 
Ultimately, the lack of support within the department to accept the necessary 
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organizational change, which would allow for a less traditional style of policing to exist, 
led to the demise of community policing.110  
In 1991, the Safe Streets, Safe City Act was passed in the state legislature. The 
Act, which was championed by Mayor Dinkins, established a city income-tax surcharge 
dedicated to hiring 6,000 more police officers. The Act also funded a host of social 
programs, most aimed at facilitating community policing.111 
In January 1993, newly hired Police Commissioner Bratton criticized Mayor 
Dinkins for spending money on social service initiatives instead of investing in additional 
police manpower. This policy was a miscalculation, in Bratton’s opinion, as a stronger 
police presence on the streets leading up to the election would have sent a positive 
message for his campaign.112 However, “3,500 of the authorized 6,000 patrol officers 
were on the streets” and all precincts had a number of community policing officers that 
were welcomed in the community.113 Bratton was also vocally critical of the community 
policing plan, citing the lack of training for officers and its unfocused approach to 
addressing crime. In his words: 
The city’s problems were complex and difficult for the most experienced 
police and social service experts; these kids were unprepared and ill-
equipped to handle them, and it’s unrealistic to expect they could.114 
Those few who could succeed were never empowered to follow through under the 
NYPD’s centralized bureaucracy. CPOP, as it was designed and implemented, was 
“fundamentally flawed” and destined to fail.115  
In July 1992, Mayor Dinkins created the Mollen Commission to investigate the 
nature, extent, and causes of police corruption in the NYPD. The Commission report was 
critical of the department; it found that there was greater concern over attracting bad 
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press than rooting out corruption.116 In April 1994, more than thirty NYPD police 
officers were charged with corruption, the largest number in more than a decade. The 
scandal, known as the “Dirty 30,” involved dozens of officers assigned to the 30th 
Precinct in the Hamilton Heights section of Harlem. They were charged with civil rights 
conspiracy, perjury, extortion, grand larceny, and possession and distribution of 
narcotics. The scandal deeply damaged the creditability of the NYPD.117 
B. BROKEN WINDOWS 
After the election, Mayor Giuliani and Commissioner Bratton both capitalized off 
the funding Dinkins had secured; within the first six months of taking office, they 
presided over two graduation ceremonies welcoming 4,200 new police officers.118  
During his first tenure as police commissioner in 1994, Bratton refocused the 
NYPD’s mission, pushing strategies based on the broken windows theory that he had 
used to transform the NYC Transit Police.119 This theory, introduced by researchers 
James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, contended that cracking down on minor quality-of-
life offenses produces a ripple effect that prevents more serious crime. Bratton believed 
that such minor violations as panhandling, graffiti, vandalism, and public drunkenness set 
the tone for a particular neighborhood, which essentially issued an invitation for more 
serious criminals to settle into the area. In their work, Wilson and Kelling concluded that 
disorder and crime are inextricably linked, and when disorder is allowed to proceed 
unchecked, a domino effect occurs.120 Bratton created a fresh agenda to combat what he 
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saw as a department “satisfied with incremental declines in crime.”121 In embracing the 
broken windows theory, Bratton wanted conditions corrected before they escalated. And 
it worked. In the mission’s first year, felony crime fell by 12.3 percent.122  
In his first year, Bratton created five crime control strategies dealing with guns, 
youth violence, drugs, domestic violence, and public disorder.123 The strategies were 
introduced and implemented in conjunction with the department’s Compstat program: a 
data-driven program highlighting “hot spots” of crime. It was a program designed to hold 
precinct commanders accountable for resource deployment and crime prevention 
strategies. Compstat was built on four concepts: accurate and timely intelligence, rapid 
deployment of resources, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up and assessment.124 
Kelling claimed that “Compstat was perhaps the single most important 
organizational/administrative innovation in policing during the latter half of the 20th 
century.”125 Bratton wanted to decentralize control from police headquarters and 
empower precinct commanders to focus on substantive community problems and 
effective crime reduction results. “Shortly after Bratton implemented these new ideas, 
crime in New York City began its historic dive. Virtually everyone was caught off 
guard.”126 
The move toward data-driven and targeted enforcement in the early 1990s led to a 
gradual shift away from community policing. Researcher Jeffrey Patterson 
acknowledged, “Community policing initiatives have been scaled back in two of its most 
prominent national settings—Houston, Texas and New York City.”127 When Bratton 
introduced Compastat into his broken windows theory–focused mission, he dramatically 
reshaped how the NYPD would address crime and disorder. He introduced Compstat to 
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enable precinct commanders to have up-to-date crime statistics, and empowered them to 
think creatively to develop individualized plans to address crime trends and conditions. 
His focus was clearly geared toward results-driven policing. Silverman, in describing the 
effect of Compstat, wrote that it “grew to wield enormous influence over the NYPD 
revolution. Driven by intelligence gathering and fueled by innovative managerial 
processes, this engine of change has jolted the NYPD bureaucracy and has propelled it to 
new crime-fighting heights.”128 
The Compstat process employed an intense, results-driven strategy for which the 
stakes were high—commanders who were not successful could be removed from their 
command, while those who were often received a promotion or advancement.129 Megars 
believes “this strategy, considered an integral principle of the Compstat process, provided 
ammunition for critics who saw Compstat as an antithesis of community and an 
ungracious return to the rational-legal bureaucratic model of policing.”130  
In 1995, the Transit Police and Housing Police merged with the NYPD, with the 
consolidation resulting in a 16-percent increase in uniformed personnel.131 The merge 
eliminated redundancy and provided more efficient and coordinated police services in 
both the transit system and public housing.   
The significant drop in crime from 1994 to 1996 and the consequential increase in 
community relations was practically obliterated in August 1997 when an on-duty officer 
sadistically tortured and sodomized a prisoner, Abner Louime, in a precinct bathroom. It 
marked “the beginning of deterioration in police/community relations.”132 Several 
thousand marched on city hall to protest against police brutality.133 Then, in 1999, 
                                                 
128 Silverman, NYPD Battles Crime, 19. 
129 Henry, Compstat Paradigm, 20. 
130 Jeffrey S. Megars, “Compstat: A New Paradigm for Policing or a Repudiation of Community 
Policing,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 20, no. 1 (2004), 70–79.  
131 Bratton, “State of the NYPD,” 76. 
132 Ibid. 




Amadou Diallo, an unarmed West African immigrant, was killed by officers assigned to 
the elite plainclothes Street Crime Unit (SCU). Mistaking his wallet for a firearm, four 
officers fired forty-one times at Diallo.134 In the two months following the shooting, 
several hundred protestors were arrested in demonstrations. Racial tension was high as 
the four officers were charged with second-degree murder.135 In the aftermath of the 
shooting, the SCU was designated as uniformed patrol and ultimately disbanded. All four 
officers involved were eventually acquitted of all the charges. Both these incidents, 
though very different in nature, tarnished the image of the NYPD and eroded the public 
trust in police. “Policing involves both negative and positive citizen contact. When the 
negative far outweighs the positive, public confidence declines.”136 
Despite these incidents, Compstat continued to drive the focus on crime 
reduction. Significant emphasis was placed on measuring police actions, such as arrests, 
summonses, and stops. By continuing to focus on crime “hot spots” and increasing 
enforcement in areas where most crime occurred (typically, the poorer minority sections 
of the city), “Compstat was instrumental in driving down overall index crime by more 
than 50 percent and homicides by 68 percent by 1999.”137 Though crime rates continued 
to fall, minorities felt the numbers-driven policing strategy was intrusive and oppressive:  
Subject to intrusive police actions, residents often experienced the focused 
enforcement activity as negative rather than positive. To them, it often felt 
as if the police were doing things to them and their neighborhoods rather 
than with them and for their neighborhoods.138  
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Today, Commissioner Bratton often refers to the intrusion and oppression as “unintended 
consequences.”139 
C. THE HOMELAND SECURITY ROLE 
Following the attacks of 9/11, the NYPD’s role significantly changed. In addition 
to its primary law enforcement role, it now took on the additional burden of keeping the 
city safe from potential terrorist attacks.140 This change resulted in a shift of resources 
away from police precincts to the newly formed Counterterrorism Bureau. Rob Chapman 
and Matthew Scheider published a report for the Office of Community Orientated 
Policing Services that raised the issue that “some police departments may abandon 
community policing for seemingly more immediate security concerns.”141 They argued 
that community policing was now more important than ever.  
In January 2003, the NYPD, under then-Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly, 
launched Operation Impact, a citywide initiative that deployed rookie officers to patrol 
high-crime hot spots referred to as “impact zones.” By flooding these areas with officers, 
primarily assigned to footposts, the initiative had an “immediate positive effect on 
reducing crime in Impact Zones.”142 Operation Impact successfully sustained crime 
reduction for more than a decade. In 2014, Commissioner Bratton applauded the program 
created by his predecessor Kelly. He did, however, critique the selection of new 
graduates from the Police Academy being thrust into the highest crime areas of the city 
with minimal mentoring or oversight. In his opinion, they lacked experience and this 
inexperience resulted in them stopping and questioning too many innocent people.143 In 
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2015, Bratton stopped the practice of assigning new graduates to impact zones. Instead, 
he implemented an eighteen-month field training program at the precinct level, ensuring 
that rookie officers operated under the tutelage of field training officers.  
In 2011, the Vera Institute of Justice studied the effects of the stop, question, and 
frisk practice in New York City, “focusing exclusively on stops of young people in 
highly patrolled, high crime areas,” and found that it adversely impacted police–
community relations.144 By this time, stops were close to 700,000, an increase of 338 
percent from 2003.145 The majority of those stopped were never charged with any 
criminal activity. The study also found that the number of stop, question, and frisks were 
disproportionately performed in minority communities.146  
Due to concerns regarding the controversial practice of stop, question, and frisk, 
and allegations of racial disparities in enforcement practices, the city council passed 
Local Law 70 in 2013, which created an inspector general to oversee the NYPD.147 Later 
that year, as a result of the class-action suit Floyd v City of New York, U.S. District Court 
Judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that the NYPD’s stop, question, and frisk practice was 
unconstitutional and resulted in widespread Fourth Amendment violations. The court 
appointed a federal monitor to oversee changes to the department’s policies and practices. 
The controversial 2014 death of Eric Garner in New York, followed a month later by the 
death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, boiled over into nation-wide protests and 
riots. The intense pressure for police to work on rebuilding trust and improving 
community–police relations, particularly in minority communities, led to a reevaluation 
of the NYPD’s policy priorities. 
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III. THE NYPD TODAY 
After twelve years at the helm of the NYPD, Police Commissioner Raymond W. 
Kelly was replaced by Police Commissioner William Bratton. Although he praised his 
predecessor for record reductions in crimes and an unparalleled municipal 
counterterrorism capability, Bratton announced his intention to change the direction of 
the department. With this change of guard in 2014, the NYPD began a glacial shift in its 
policing strategy. Commissioner Bratton began with his “Reengineering Initiative,” for 
which he tasked hundreds of officers and civilian employees with recommending 
improvements for the internal and external functioning of the NYPD. His administration 
then initiated dozens of substantial, and sometimes fundamental, changes to the 
department. His administration focused on the following strategies: 
• targeting enforcement against the small criminal element responsible for a 
disproportionate amount of crime in New York City. 
• improving and increasing in-service training of officers. 
• increasing the utilization of technology. 
• refocusing on community policing. 
• prioritizing efforts to increase police legitimacy and transparency. 
These strategies were primarily based on Commissioner Bratton’s belief that the 
department needed to build a deeper relationship with the community, which required 
long-term commitment, collaboration, and trust. Under his helm, the department’s most 
notable relationship-building effort was the implementation of the Neighborhood 
Coordination program. This neighborhood-based program dedicated officers to actively 
engage with the community at the local level. Although the program is still in its infancy, 
it has received praise from the public, especially in minority neighborhoods. 
Commissioner James O’Neill took over the helm at the end of 2016, and has continued 





A. NEIGHBORHOOD POLICING STRATEGY 
When Commissioner Bratton returned to the NYPD in 2014, he recognized the 
need to build trust and form new alliances with the community. In 2015, he introduced a 
new model for patrol and community engagement. The strategy was inspired by the Los 
Angeles Police Department’s Senior Lead Officer Program. His Neighborhood-Based 
Policing Plan established a new uniformed position: the neighborhood coordination 
officer (NCO). The NCOs are highly trained senior police officers and detectives 
empowered to work with the community to identify conditions and develop 
individualized strategies to address them. Working collaboratively with community 
partners, they “set priorities, design strategies, and guide police action at the 
neighborhood level.”148 The program also identifies and engages with influential 
members of the communities, bringing them into the fold as “community partners.” 
This strategy is being steadily expanded citywide, on a precinct-by-precinct basis, 
with the eventual goal of having all seventy-seven precincts operating on this model. The 
plan requires dedicated steady sector cars to remain working in the same neighborhood 
each day, so that they may work collaboratively with the NCOs and the community. This 
model requires a heavy investment of human capital, with the requisite increase in 
uniformed headcount at the precinct level. As such, the department is reallocating 
resources from other areas. 
B. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the NYPD built the largest and most robust municipal 
counterterrorism bureau in the world. Its primary mission is to defend New York City 
from future terrorist attacks. It was created on the “realization that the City could not rely 
solely on the federal government for its defense.”149  
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Currently, more than 1,000 officers are assigned to the department’s 
counterterrorism mission full time. Over the years, the department has employed a 
number of counterterrorism initiatives.  
In 2003, the NYPD implemented a comprehensive security plan known as 
Operation Atlas that incorporates highly visible deployments throughout 
the city. These are designed to disrupt terrorist planning and surveillance 
operations and include Critical Response Vehicle (CRV) surges, Hercules 
Team deployments, Transit Order Maintenance Sweeps (TOMS), and 
Subway Explosive Trace Detection checkpoints.150 
The CRV consisted of teams of two officers from each of the seventy-seven police 
precincts that were deployed at strategic locations across the city in a massive show of 
police presence. In 2015, CRV surges were replaced by a full-time force, the Critical 
Response Command (CRC), consisting of nearly 500 specially trained and equipped 
officers under the command of the Counterterrorism Bureau. The heavy-weapons teams 
(known as Hercules) are elite, heavily armed members of the department’s Emergency 
Service Unit.  
In addition, the department has dramatically bolstered its Intelligence Division, 
with a large portion of its resources being dedicated to counterterrorism intelligence 
gathering. Then-Deputy Commissioner David Cohen, a thirty-five-year veteran of the 
Criminal Intelligence Agency (CIA), revamped and modernized the bureau. For example, 
the number of NYPD uniformed personnel assigned to the NYC Joint Terrorism Task 
Force was increased from seventeen to one hundred twenty-five.151 Commissioner Cohen 
also initiated the International Liaison Program, which was sponsored by the NYC Police 
Foundation. Established in 2002, the Program stations intelligence officers in twelve 
international cities to provide firsthand knowledge of any terror plot or attack to the 
NYPD’s executive staff in as close to real-time as possible.152 These assignments include 
London, Tel Aviv, Abu Dhabi, Singapore, Lyon, Paris, Sydney, Amman, Madrid, Santa 
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Domingo, Toronto, and Montreal. The locations were chosen based on criteria, including 
opportunities for collaboration with the host-nation police and intelligence services and 
the geographic agility to respond to global events. 
A recent technological initiative aiding the department’s counterterrorism mission 
is the adoption of the Domain Awareness System (DAS), developed in conjunction with 
Microsoft. Initially, DAS consisted of a network surveillance system comprising over 
6,000 private and public cameras and hundreds of license readers. Through DAS, the 
NYPD can monitor thousands of cameras around the city, scan license plates, identify 
radiation emissions from vehicles, and determine criminal and terrorism suspects’ 
information from dozens of criminal databases ... all in near-real time.153 The department 
has continued to expand the capabilities of DAS, putting the system’s full capabilities 
into the hands of each of its over 36,000 officers.  
In response to a number of terror attacks overseas, the NYPD created two new 
units in 2015, the CRC, composed of 527 UMOS, and the Strategic Response Group, a 
group of 800 UMOS. The units are highly trained, mobile, and equipped with heavy 
weapons. In the event of an attack, the NYPD has designated over 2,000 highly trained 
and specially equipped officers that can be swiftly deployed to anywhere in the city, 
making the NYPD’s capability to respond to a terror attack stronger than ever before.  
C. BODY-WORN CAMERA (BWC) POLICY 
In March 2017, the NYPD issued an operations order that outlined its policy and 
procedures for a citywide pilot project for BWCs. The “program will serve to provide a 
contemporaneous, objective record of encounters, facilitate review by supervisors, foster 
accountability, and encourage lawful and respectful interactions between the public and 
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the police.”154 The aim of the project is to examine, methodologically, the effect BWCs 
have on officer safety, the ability to ascertain evidence that can assist in criminal 
prosecutions, resolving civilian complaints, reducing unconstitutional stops, and 
promoting positive relations with the community.  
The policy was developed by the NYPD in collaboration with “key stakeholders 
and advocates, including: the NYPD Inspector General; the NYC’s respective District 
Attorneys; members of the NYC Council; the NYC Public Advocate; NYCLU; Civilian 
Complaint Review Board; Patrolman’s Benevolent Association; and Citizens Crime 
Commission.”155 The policy covers when, and under what circumstances, the cameras 
should be activated, how the footage can be reviewed, shared, and investigated, and how 
long recordings should be retained.  
Mandatory activation is required in several clearly delineated circumstances, 
including possible arrest situations, adversarial incidents, vehicle stops, the issuance of a 
summonses, and any interaction with an emotionally disturbed person. The policy allows 
for exigent circumstance to activate the camera when feasible and safe, after taking 
necessary police action to protect human life and remain safe. The policy also contains a 
provision for when discretionary activation is allowed, that is when “in the member’s 
judgment it would be beneficial to record.”156 It also establishes several instances when 
BWC recording is prohibited, such as performing non-enforcement duties, attending 
department meetings or training, performing a strip search, interviewing a current or 
potential confidential informant, and when an undercover officer is present. In general, 
BWCs will not be activated during demonstrations or civil disobedience, unless engaged 
in an activity captured under the mandatory activation clause. 
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Currently, the NYPD is moving into Phase 1 of its BWC program; it is a court-
mandated, cluster-randomized, controlled trial to evaluate the impact BWCs have on the 
behavior of both officers and civilians. The experiment is being led by Federal Monitor 
Peter Zimroth to deploy approximately 1,000 BWCs in twenty patrol precincts, and issue 
them to officers assigned to the third platoon (1500x2300 hours).157 Each “treatment” 
precinct will be matched with a pre-selected control precinct and evaluated for a rolling 
one-year period. Phase 2, expected to begin in 2018, will greatly expand the deployment 
of BWCs, although the exact details are to be determined.158 Phase 3, slated to begin in 
2019, will theoretically equip each officer in the department with a BWC.159  
D. SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 
After many years of ad hoc usage, the NYPD established a formal policy 
regarding the use of social media for investigative purposes in 2012. The policy provides 
guidelines for utilizing social media for investigative purposes. Specifically, it provides a 
framework for gathering intelligence while balancing privacy expectations. This policy 
order addresses legal and operational considerations, such as when a member needs 
access to online accounts maintained by service providers. Some information may be 
obtained with a subpoena, while other information requires a special court order or search 
warrant.160 The policy also outlines the necessary steps members can take to avoid 
detection, since accessing any social media site using an NYPD network connection can 
identify the NYPD as the user. 
It was not until 2016 that the department promulgated a formal policy that 
provided procedures for social media account establishment, management, 
administration, oversight, and guidance for individual use. The procedure mandates that 
all social media accounts must be approved by the deputy commissioner of strategic 
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communication (DCSC).161 Generally, only commanding officers, bureau chiefs, and 
deputy commissioners are authorized to establish social media accounts. 
Commanders/account holders may designate one or more members of their command to 
post content on behalf of the command. All members granted hosting privileges are 
required to attend training provided by the DCSC.  
During large-scale emergency incidents, or as otherwise determined by the chief 
of department, individual and command Twitter accounts will be directed to relay 
messages disseminated by the department. In a large emergency, the deputy 
commissioner of public information will coordinate with DCSC personnel to transmit 
messages to the public via the department’s social media platforms. Department Twitter 
account holders will receive a targeted message instructing them to redirect and/or 
retweet messages disseminated by the department’s Twitter account. Upon cessation or 
de-escalation of the incident, account holders may resume their routine messaging.162 
The department’s social media policy is meant to minimize controversial, 
inaccurate, and/or contradictory postings by members of the NYPD, and it ensures 
unified messages regarding large-scale events, emergencies, and sensitive incidents. This 
function is important for the accurate and timely dissemination of information to the 
public. Yet the NYPD’s restrictive social media policy is not as robust as it could be. The 
department almost exclusively utilizes only the social media platforms of Twitter and, to 
a lesser degree, Facebook, and account holders vary greatly in their social media usage, 
both in volume and context. Many precinct commanders focus their tweets primarily on 
enforcement activity, such as high-profile arrests and large-scale drugs busts, entirely 
foregoing news regarding community outreach initiatives. The department’s social media 
strategy is focused on one-way messaging and rarely invites public feedback. There is a 
nearly universal focus on output versus input and a complete lack of department-
sanctioned blogs and public discussion forums. 
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IV. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Policing in the United Kingdom was founded on the principle of “policing by 
consent,” with a historical policing model that relies on the cooperation and agreement of 
the people. To this day, its police do not routinely carry guns, nor are they equipped with 
military-style equipment. Learning from past mistakes, namely the Brixton Riots in the 
early 1980s, the United Kingdom enacted the Reform Act of 2002, requiring the 
development of a national plan committed to community engagement at every level. The 
plan is based on a service-delivery model that is developed through partnerships and 
collaboration with stakeholders. The plan recognizes the importance of engaging diverse 
communities, and relies on high-visibility officers that are accessible to the community. 
The working partnerships have enabled residents to feel empowered, while giving 
officers a sense of personal fulfillment.   
The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, CONTEST, is heavily 
invested in community engagement. The strategy places a large emphasis on preventing 
the radicalization of those who might otherwise feel disenfranchised by engaging in 
community outreach, collaboration, inclusion, and transparency. 
A. NEIGHBORHOOD/COMMUNITY POLICING 
The development of community policing began in the United Kingdom in the 
mid-1980s, with the goal of sensitizing the police to neighborhood ethnic and cultural 
differences and promoting greater interaction with the community toward the resolution 
of persistent neighborhood crime and disorder problems. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the United Kingdom was in recession; there was mass unemployment, youth 
alienation, and conflicts over race and class inequality, all of which resulted in protests 
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and riots.163 As a result of those incidents, the United Kingdom developed its 
community-engagement strategies.164 
Community policing and variations of it underlie much of police practice today in 
the United Kingdom. Two significant acts of Parliament in the United Kingdom 
spearheaded community policing efforts: the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 and the 
Police Reform Act in 2002. The Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 granted local authorities 
more responsibility in developing ways to reduce crime and disorder within their 
communities.165 The provision required local authorities to collaborate with all sectors of 
the community: residents, landlords, businesses, police, health authority, etc. The Police 
Reform Act in 2002 created the National Police Plan and police community support 
officers—para-professionals who facilitate community engagement and assist in 
addressing minor crime, allowing local patrol officers to focus on “front-line duties.”166 
Every year, a three-year plan is produced that sets out the strategy for the United 
Kingdom’s police forces. 
Neighborhood policing emphasizes a local approach to policing that is accessible 
to the public and responsive to individual neighborhood needs. It incorporates all of the 
neighborhood stakeholders in the design and delivery of police service. Neighborhoods 
also benefitted from increased police accessibility and visibility. Residents reported 
increased empowerment, perceived reductions in crime, and improved perceptions of 
safety. Likewise, community partners reported improved efficiencies, more effective 
problem solving, and personal fulfillment.  
                                                 
163 Kenan Malik, “The Failure of Multiculturalism: Community Versus Society in Europe,” 
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Beginning in 2002, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) began recruiting 
police community support officers to work in conjunction with neighborhood policing 
teams containing special constables and beat managers. Their mission is to provide high-
visibility patrol, tackle anti-social behavior, deal with minor offenses, gather criminal 
intelligence, and support front-line policing.167  
Guidance set forth from the Home Office has always fostered an emphasis on 
collaboration and the need for community engagement. The MPS is committed to 
developing and continually improving community engagement. The Service has a 
Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team that collaborates with communities 
and offers a website with links to neighborhood teams, community updates, hotlines, 
etc.168 In addition, MPS recognizes the need for independent advisory groups (IAGs) that 
can “provide advice and guidance to help prevent critical events escalating … [and] a 
sounding board for the police to understand the potential impact on communities of 
police practices and operations.”169 Another practice of engagement is the MPS London 
Muslim Communities Forum. The Forum brings senior police officers together with 
representatives from London’s diverse Muslim communities “with the aim of addressing 
issues raised by the Muslim community and working together to provide a strategic 
response.”170 Together, all of these community-based programs have developed a robust, 
multi-faceted community-based policing model within the MPS. 
B. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
The United Kingdom, and in particular the London Police Service, took a 
different direction by fully embracing community policing in its counterterrorism 
strategy. The United Kingdom’s strategy, CONTEST, is organized around four work 
                                                 
167 “Police Community Support Officers: The Role of the PCSO,” Metropolitan Police, June 2, 2015, 
https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/careers/police-community-support-officer/Pages/default.aspx. 
168 “Communities Together,” Metropolitan Police, accessed June 4, 2017, http://212.62.21.14/ 
Site/communitiestogether. 
169 Metropolitan Police, “MPS Quality Standards for Engagement,” Safer-London, July 2012, 8, 
http://safer-london.info/resources/MPS+Quality+Standard+for+Community+Engagement.pdf. 
170 “London Muslim Communities Forum,” Metropolitan Police, accessed June 4, 2017, 
https://www.met.police.uk/about-the-met/london-muslim-communities-forum/. 
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streams: pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare.171 The “prevent” stream is almost entirely 
focused on community outreach, cultural awareness, and sensitivity training. “The aim of 
CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from 
terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence,” according 
to the Home Office.172 The goal is to stop people from being radicalized into terrorism by 
educating them and offering “appropriate advice and support.”173 Acknowledging that 
they cannot “resolve the threats simply by arresting and prosecuting people,” much of the 
strategy centers around collaboration, inclusion, and transparency.174 A large part of the 
“prevent” strategy is dedicated to preventing radicalization. To achieve this aim, police 
must counter the extremists’ narratives, and encourage the extremists to open their 
narratives to debate and dialogue. The integration strategy is based on identifying 
common ground, shared values, respect, and the ability for upward mobility and 
empowerment.175   
An essential part of the strategy requires education and comprehensive cultural 
awareness training for police. Community outreach and open dialogue must work to 
challenge ideology, and its purpose is to reach the small number of people vulnerable to 
radicalization. For CONTEST to work effectively, participating agencies and individual 
officers must possess solid cultural understanding and encourage close cooperation and 
coordination with the diverse communities they serve. 
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The research focused on the challenges facing police today with the ever-
increasing threat to homeland security. It also examined the role that race has played in 
policing and the criminal justice system. The research found police legitimacy must 
remain an important element in building and sustaining trust between police and the 
communities they serve. Another conclusion drawn was that the use of new technology, 
including BWCs and social media, increases police transparency and accountability.  
Reviewing the evolving eras in policing was crucial to setting the foundation for 
this thesis. It demonstrated that while the role of police has changed and adapted to 
social, economic, and political concerns, it has not deviated (nor should it) from the 
principals of Sir Robert Peel, wherein policing required securing the cooperation of the 
public. In examining how community policing evolved in the United Kingdom, some 
commonalities could be drawn with the American approach. The main difference 
between the approaches is that the United Kingdom has a national plan with a 
community-based policing strategy that is spearheaded by two significant acts of 
Parliament. In the decade following the events of September 11, 2001, many police 
departments in the United States, in particular the NYPD, shifted resources away from 
grassroots policing and toward the mission of fighting terrorism.  
This research found that the United Kingdom was heavily invested in community 
engagement with its police. This engagement came about mainly from the lessons learned 
from the violence in the late 1970s and the Brixton riots in the early 1980s. The National 
Plan had clear and specific requirements for community engagement. The U.K. College 
of Policing created a set of core standards for how the Kingdom’s police forces were to 
engage and communicate. It included much of what was discussed in the literature 
review. Public perception and the recognition of police legitimacy should not be 
underestimated. Having legitimate and fair decision-making processes in place can assist 
in improving institutional trust. This legitimacy and trust building helps foster greater 
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social responsibility, resulting in better relationships between the police and the 
community, in turn making people more likely to respect the law and assist the police.  
The United Kingdom’s National Plan focuses on identifying neighborhood 
priorities and concerns, and ensures a collaborative approach to addressing these issues. 
There is great value in having a published strategy on community engagement, so the 
public can have confidence in the police’s understanding of community needs. The IAGs 
provide a level of accountability and transparency that should be commended. Police 
have a responsibility to protect and serve; at times, the service part of the construct 
gets lost.  
The NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau’s capabilities are the most robust of any 
police agency in the world; it is a tremendous show of force when CRC units are 
deployed to a potential high-profile target. When dozens of marked patrol cars converge 
on a given location with their turret lights on, thousands of New Yorkers and visitors stop 
in awe to watch. There is no other police department able to rapidly deploy the number of 
heavy weapons–trained personnel on any given day to respond to multiple attacks 
simultaneously. A massive show of force at major infrastructure sites, daily deployments 
of Hercules, and stationing of intelligence officers in major metropolitan areas across the 
world are just a few components of an impressively built counterterrorism strategy—a 
strategy that most likely, due to personnel resources, budget constraints, and 
technological advancements, could not be matched by any police department in 
the world. 
The NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau shows enormous dedication and 
commitment in its primary mission to keep New York City safe from another terrorist 
attack. However, the research has identified some gaps in that mission, namely the lack 
of community engagement and transparency. The Bureau’s Demographics Unit 
eavesdropped on Muslims in the neighborhoods where they ate, worked, and prayed. This 
tactic was later challenged in court and found to be unconstitutional. It was disbanded 
under Commissioner Bratton, who acknowledged that the unit never led to any 
intelligence indicating credible threats. Disbanding the unit was one of many actions 
Bratton took in order to heal rifts in the Muslim community.   
 47 
The research found that implementing certain components of CONTEST could 
help the NYPD build trust between the minority community and the police. At the core of 
CONTEST is community involvement and outreach, and it recognizes the potential harm 
caused when the police are not engaging with the ethnic minority community. The 
overarching theme throughout this thesis is policing by consent, and for that to be done 
effectively requires input from citizens, which means empowering the community to 
become part of the solution to the problems they have identified. How do they want their 
neighborhood to look? What are their expectations of the police? The CONTEST strategy 
to pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare is as robust as the NYPD’s counterterrorism 
policy, but it is strengthened by its commitment to engage, communicate, educate, and 
collaborate. 
It is important for the police to be viewed as legitimate. However, much of what 
shapes this view depends on one’s immediate social and physical environment. Extensive 
debate regarding police legitimacy plays out in the media, so now more than ever it is 
incumbent on police agencies to tell their stories. There are many ways that police can 
build a successful counter-narrative, but they must involve all the stakeholders. Improved 
training in procedural justice, identifying implicit bias, and promoting a diversified police 
force are some of the measures that can improve legitimacy. Likewise, having 
independent oversight can improve accountability and transparency.  
Another element of this research was to identify gaps and to recommend solutions 
to affect positive change in the policing of minority communities in New York City. The 
goal is to have a collaborative approach between the public and the police, where there is 
shared responsibility for maintaining public safety. The ultimate solution is for the public 





The following recommendations are made with the intent to provide solutions that 
will increase trust between police and the community, specifically in minority 
communities where trust has been damaged due to overzealous police practices such as 
“stop, question, and frisk.” If implemented, the recommendations will move the NYPD 
toward a more balanced counterterrorism strategy that actively engages with 
communities. 
(1) Equip the entire patrol force with BWCs, ensure buy-in by the officers, 
and create a comprehensive public policy regarding BWC use. 
Technology can play a role in enhancing police legitimacy. BWCs will help bring 
immediate transparency and accountability to the NYPD, and help heal rifts between 
police and their communities. The cameras can quickly clarify interactions and provide 
evidence for prosecution. The benefits of using BWCs are numerous, and most of the 
implementation considerations mentioned can be mitigated. However, it is important for 
police departments to have a comprehensive policy developed before implementation.  
Using feedback from key stakeholders, the NYPD has developed a policy on the 
use of BWCs for its pilot program. Unfortunately, there is already a class-action lawsuit 
demanding that recordings be mandated for more types of police–citizen interactions and 
objecting to the policy of allowing officers to view videos before making official 
statements while incidents are under investigation. Hopefully, the pilot program provides 
much-needed methodological data and garners positive feedback from the communities 
where the BWCs are being deployed. The department should also recognize that this 
program is an area where the intelligent use of social media can be advantageous for 
improving police–community relations. 
The initial deployment of 1,000 BWCs in a department the size of the NYPD is 
woefully insufficient, and covers just 5 percent of the patrol force. Once the pilot project 
is complete, it is recommended that the entire patrol force, approximately 20,000 officers, 
be issued BWCs. This considerable investment will, in the long run, protect both the 
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community and the officers by increasing accountability and enhancing transparency and 
police legitimacy. 
(2) Expand the NYPD’s social media footprint. 
The NYPD needs to expand its social media footprint in order to enhance 
transparency and goodwill. Most commands have Twitter accounts, but few use 
Facebook or other social media platforms. Utilization of NYPD-sponsored community 
blogs and Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat accounts would provide a wide array of 
platforms on which to describe the work police do in the community, request the public’s 
assistance and collaboration, and inform residents of opportunities and services available 
to them. These forums can be used to send information about crime trends, tips, and 
current events. They can also be used as a tool to build stronger relationships in the 
community by providing forums for dialogue and allowing for feedback from the 
community. By capitalizing on these potential benefits, the NYPD can substantially 
increase public perception of transparency and engagement.  
In addition to traditional press releases following major or controversial incidents, 
the NYPD can utilize social media to actively promulgate positive stories about everyday 
police work. Some of these stories can be released in multi-part series, allowing the 
public to see initiatives and programs develop over time. This publicity will allow the 
community to see officers as humans, real people like everyone else. The department has 
begun to dabble with this content on social media and it is recommended that the NYPD 
formerly prioritize this increased use. A greater focus on the service element of the 
NYPD narrative cannot only improve public perception, but also provide an avenue for 
the NYPD to communicate directly with the public, helping build confidence, trust, and 
understanding. Strategizing content and broadcasting community-based efforts will 
promote the department’s service component, an area that sometimes gets lost in the 
never-ending effort to protect. 
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(3) Create the new position of Muslim coordination officer, assigned to the 
NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau. 
In 2015, the NYPD implemented its Neighborhood-Based Policing model and 
created the new position of neighborhood coordination officer (NCO). It is recommended 
that the NYPD emulate the NCO program with the creation of Muslim coordination 
officers (MCOs). MCOs would be assigned to the department’s Counterterrorism Bureau 
and, as such, would be hand selected and receive specialized training. They would be 
tasked with promoting general goodwill, dispelling rumors and innuendos, and sharing 
non-classified intelligence with the city’s Muslim communities. Likewise, the MCOs 
would engage community partners and gain intelligence from the very same 
communities.  
On a day-to-day basis, MCOs would be collaborative problem solvers, interacting 
with religious institutions, schools, community partners, and the Muslim community at 
large. They will be entrusted with creating police–community programs and initiatives 
specifically tailored to the Muslim communities to which they are assigned. The deeper 
trust enabled by individuals with shared cultural and religious beliefs will help break 
down barriers that past police practices have created. If implemented properly, the 
relationships formed between MCOs and the Muslim communities will become an 
invaluable tool for intelligence gathering and information sharing, and at the same time 
will create a sense of shared commitment, in turn helping build trust in the police.   
(4) Move toward a more holistic approach to counterterrorism by integrating 
more elements of community policing into the department’s 
counterterrorism strategy. 
The NYPD counterterrorism strategy relies heavily on its ability to display 
massive “shows of force” and utilize covert surveillance tactics, as opposed to the United 
Kingdom’s, which relies more on community outreach and trust building. Although both 
omnipresence and traditional intelligence gathering are effective tactics, the NYPD can 
benefit from a more holistic approach to its counterterrorism strategy, including proactive 
community engagement, utilizing both NCOs and MCOs to collaborate on problem 
solving.  
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It is recommended the NYPD implement more community-based policies to 
increase communication and empower citizens to participate in prioritizing what is 
important to them and what services their specific neighborhoods require. NCOs are 
already encouraged to be proactive and creative in their problem-solving approach to 
community problems, but a greater emphasis on community engagement is 
recommended. A greater level of engagement will enable both the public and police to 
gain a better understanding of the effect of policing on individuals and the communities.  
Neighborhood policing, through which the public has an active say in the 
decision-making process, will help build public engagement. True engagement will lead 
to greater intelligence gathering and will foster mutual respect, leading to greater public 
confidence in police and increased job satisfaction for officers. This geographic approach 
to policing will enable officers to gain a better understanding of the community’s needs. 
Thus, community engagement is paramount to having a robust, proactive 
counterterrorism strategy. In addition to the aforementioned recommendation to create 
MCOs, the NYPD should incorporate its NCO program into its counterterrorism strategy. 
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